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Earnings management and the distribution 
of earnings relative to targets: UK evidence 
Pelham Gore, Peter F. Pope, Ashni K. Singh* 
Abstract-In this paper we provide new evidence on discontinuities in the distribution of reported earnings, using 
a large sample of UK firms. We examine the discontinuity phenomenon in the context of earnings management. We 
report that the empirical distribution of earnings before discretionary working capital accruals does not reflect the 
unusually high frequencies of small surpluses and unusually low frequencies of small deficits relative to targets 
found in the distribution of actual (reported) earnings, i.e. after discretionary working capital accruals. We find that 
discretionary working capital accruals have the effect of significantly increasing the frequencies of firms achieving 
earnings targets both overall and by small margins. Thus, we document an explicit link between working capital 
accruals-based earnings management and the discontinuities observed in the empirical distribution of earnings rel- 
ative to targets. We also examine earnings management before and after the issuance of FRS 3 ‘Reporting Financial 
Performance’ and find evidence that FRS 3 altered earnings management strategies adopted by companies. 
Key words: Accounting manipulation, discretionary accruals, earnings management. 
Data availability: Data are available from the public or commercial sources identified in the paper. 
1. Introduction 
The corporate scandals of the late 1990s and early 
2000s seriously undermined public confidence in 
financial reporting and hence in financial markets. 
Suspicions that reported earnings numbers cannot 
be relied upon, and that they are managed, are 
widespread. Academic interest in this area began 
before the causes ce‘ltbre occurred and has since 
grown, focusing on investigations into why and 
how earnings management is conducted. One par- 
ticular line of research centres on the finding that 
the empirical distribution of earnings relative to 
basic targets displays discontinuities at zero. In 
particular, evidence that small negative earnings 
levels, changes and surprises occur with unexpect- 
edly low frequency and small positive earnings 
levels, changes and non-negative surprises occur 
with unexpectedly high frequency (Hayn, 1995; 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 
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1999; Burgstahler and Eames, 2003, 2006). One 
potential explanation of this behaviour is earnings 
management to beat benchmarks, e.g. to avoid 
losses. Consistent with this explanation, Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997) find that both operating cash 
flow and working capital accruals (WCA) rise 
sharply when reported earnings is just above zero. 
Evidence on benchmark beating earnings has 
been used in extensively in subsequent earnings 
management research (see, for example, Payne 
and Robb, 2000; Beaver et al., 2003,2004; Dichev 
and Skinner, 2002; Beatty et al., 2002; Leuz et al., 
2003; Leone and Van Horn, 2005; Phillips et al., 
2003; Frank and Rego, 2004; Roychowdhury, 
2006). However, recent research has raised doubts 
about whether earnings management does indeed 
explain the observed discontinuities in the distri- 
bution of earnings (e.g. Dechow et al., 2003; 
Degeorge et al., 1999; Durtschi and Easton, 2005). 
In this paper we contribute to this literature in two 
main ways. First, we analyse an extensive non-US 
dataset for the first time in the literature, thereby 
confirming that the discontinuities previously re- 
ported in the literature are not specific to the US 
setting. Second, we introduce new tests lending 
support to the hypothesis that the discontinuities in 
earnings distributions are associated with accruals- 
based earnings management in our sample. 
Using a variety of tests, Dechow et al. (2003) are 
unable to find systematic evidence of accruals 
management connected to discontinuities in earn- 
ings distributions for their US sample. When they 
compare small profit firm-years with all others, 
they find that the former have higher average dis- 
cretionary accruals (DACC), cash flows and total 
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accruals than the latter. However, when they com- 
pare small profit firm-years with small loss firm- 
years, they find insignificant differences between 
the two groups. Dechow et al. (2003) also compare 
zero earnings surprise firm-years with all others 
and with small negative surprise firm-years. They 
find that zero surprise firm-years have higher 
DACC and WCA than all other firm-years and 
higher WCA than small negative surprise firm- 
years. However, Dechow et al. (2003) find that the 
difference between average DACC for zero and 
small negative surprise firm-years is statistically 
insignificant. They conclude that earnings man- 
agement to achieve targets via real (operating) de- 
cisions is a more likely explanation for the 
discontinuities. 
Degeorge et al. (1999) suggest that the distribu- 
tional irregularities could be a manifestation of 
scaling earnings. Durtschi and Easton (DE) (2005) 
also suggest that scaling is important in under- 
standing the discontinuities in the distribution of 
deflated earnings per share. DE argue that use of 
beginning of year stock price to deflate earnings 
per share can induce discontinuities for two rea- 
sons. First stock price depends on earnings - the 
stock prices for firms with small losses are system- 
atically lower than stock prices for small profits. 
Second, loss firms are more likely to have missing 
values for beginning of year stock prices in their 
data, resulting in potential selection bias. DE argue 
that both these effects can lead to 'spurious' dis- 
continuities in the distribution of scaled earnings 
that are unconnected to earnings management. 
Beaver et al. (2004) suggest that the asymmetric 
treatment of profits and losses and the recognition 
of special items together might account for up to 
two thirds of the discontinuity. However, they do 
not rule out the possibility of other factors being 
important, including abnormal accruals (p.34). In 
contrast, Jacob and Jorgensen (2005) show that 
fourth-quarter earnings are considerably more 
volatile. While annual earnings measured over the 
fiscal year display the expected discontinuities, 
these discontinuities are not evident in different 
annual periods ending in quarters one, two or there 
of the fiscal year. Overall, Jacob and Jorgensen 
(2005) conclude that their results are consistent 
with manipulation of fiscal year earnings. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
In summary, there is no clear consensus in the 
recent literature as to whether discontinuities in 
earnings distributions reflect earnings manage- 
ment or are research design biases. In this paper 
we undertake a detailed examination of earnings 
management around earnings thresholds, using a 
large sample of UK firms. We focus on earnings 
management involving manipulation of working 
capital accruals. In contrast to Dechow et al. 
(2003) we present evidence consistent with eam- 
ings management to achieve targets. In particular 
we show that adjustment of earnings for discre- 
tionary accruals eliminates the discontinuity 
around earnings targets. 
Accounting manipulation of working capital ac- 
cruals (WCA) suggests itself as a potentially pop- 
ular technique for achieving earnings targets. 
Healy ( 1985: 103) points out that accrual manipu- 
lation is less costly and more feasible on a multi- 
period basis than accounting method changes as a 
means of transferring earnings between periods. 
Further, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994: 158) view 
WCA as more susceptible to manipulation than 
non-working capital accruals. In this study, we in- 
vestigate the links between the discretionary com- 
ponent (termed discretionary accruals, hereafter 
DACC) of WCA, the frequency of earnings target 
achievement and the observed discontinuity in the 
distribution of earnings relative to basic targets.' 
The targets we consider are the achievement of 
positive earnings levels and changes and the 
avoidance of negative earnings surprises. Our pri- 
mary objective is to determine whether DACC, a 
frequently used proxy for earnings management, 
contribute significantly to the unexpectedly high 
frequencies of positive, particularly small positive, 
earnings levels, changes and surprises.' We also 
wish to obtain an insight into the overall impact of 
DACC on the distribution of earnings relative to 
targets, and hence to provide evidence on whether 
manipulation of the accruals process is an impor- 
tant earnings management tool. 
Our paper is novel because i t  provides specific 
evidence on the manner in which firms use DACC 
with reference to basic earnings targets. Prior stud- 
ies have typically used DACC as a proxy for eam- 
ings management without specifying the manner 
in which firms use DACC to manage earnings. For 
example, Becker et al. (1998) and Francis et al. 
( 1999), although both hypothesising that Big 5 
(then Big 6) auditors constrain earnings manaoe- 
ment more effectively than non-Big 5 auditors, in- 
terpret this prediction differently. Becker et al. 
( 1998) imply that signed DACC are negatively as- 
sociated with the presence of Big 5 auditors while 
Francis et al. (1999) imply that it is crbsoltrte 
DACC that are negatively associated with the 
presence of Big 5 auditors. This reflects different 
underlying assumptions about the manner in 
9 ~ ' We define DACC as the discretionary component of total 
working capital accruals. DACC are also defined. elsewhere 
in the literature. as the discretionary component of total accru- 
als including long-term accruals such as depreciation. We use 
the expression DACC in referring,!: other studies that use that 
expression even if they define i t  ditterently from us. I n  Section 
3. we explain our definition of DACC and the estimation tech- 
nique we use. 
See footnote 6 for a detailed expliaution of our  usage of 
positive and negative. 
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which firms use DACC to manage earnings? 
A further contribution of the paper is to provide 
evidence on whether the phenomenon of disconti- 
nuities in the distribution of earnings extends 
beyond the US corporate environment and GAAP 
regime. In recent years, there has been heightened 
interest in the impact of different economic envi- 
ronments and GAAP regimes on the attributes of 
accounting earnings (Pope and Walker 1999; Ali 
and Hwang 2000; Ball et al. 2000), and on the in- 
cidence of earnings and forecast management 
(Brown and Higgins 2001). In addition, Leuz et al. 
(2003) provide evidence of a correlation between 
loss avoidance and accruals-based measures of 
earnings management. This paper extends and 
deepens this growing international accounting lit- 
erature by reporting detailed evidence of the links 
between earnings discontinuities and accruals ma- 
nipulation based on a large sample of UK firms. 
The UK context is interesting for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the incentives for earnings man- 
agement differ from those in the US (the basis of 
most research to date). Ball et al. (2000: 25-29) 
point out that the UK has the least regulated and 
least litigious accounting environment among the 
common-law countries they study, and that corpo- 
rate debt is primarily private in the UK. According 
to Ball et al. (2000), these factors imply a reduced 
demand for timely incorporation of bad news into 
accounting earnings reported by UK firms. Such 
lower demand for timely reporting of bad news al- 
lows managers greater flexibility compared to the 
US to manage earnings through timing of recogni- 
tion. In seeming contrast, Brown and Higgins 
(2001) cite evidence that UK managers have vast- 
ly smaller holdings of stock options than their U.S. 
counterparts, and thus suggest that UK managers 
have less incentive to manipulate earnings to avoid 
reporting bad news than US managers. However, 
in their 2005 paper, Brown and Higgins suggest 
that the impact of differences in expectations man- 
agement behaviour between countries may partial- 
ly explain the apparent differences in incentives 
for earnings management.“ 
Another UK-specific feature is the regime 
change that occurred regarding the reporting of ex- 
traordinary items. Prior to the issuances of FRS 3 
(Accounting Standards Board, 1992), the majority 
of extraordinary debits concerned restructurings of 
I25 
Alternatively. or additionally, it implies different assump- 
tions on the loss function of auditors. 
‘The literature of which this latter paper forms a part exam- 
ines the manipulation by company management of analyst ex- 
pectations. i.e. seeking to guide downwards expectations. 
rather than having to (or in addition to) managing earnings up- 
wards. 
We use the term non-discretionary earnings to mean earn- 
ings before DACC. or unmanaged earnings ignoring earnings 
management effected other than through DACC. 
businesses, i.e. seemingly not extraordinary in na- 
ture, whereas many apparently extraordinary cred- 
its were treated as merely ‘exceptional’ and taken 
as ‘above the line’ income. One of the reasons 
given for the issuance of FRS 3 was thus to elimi- 
nate the use of extraordinary items as a means of 
earnings management. We are thus able to exam- 
ine the use of extraordinary items as an earnings 
management tool, both pre- and post-FRS 3 .  
Our results indicate that the earnings levels, 
changes and surprises of UK firms, like those of 
US firms, are distributed discontinuously around 
zero. Specifically, we observe unusually low inci- 
dence of small negative earnings levels, changes 
and surprises, and unusually high incidence of 
small positive earnings levels, changes and sur- 
prises. However, non-discretionary earnings lev- 
els, changes and surprises for the same sample are 
distributed without this discontinuity at zero, sug- 
gesting that the discontinuity in the earnings distri- 
bution is attributable to DACC.5 We further 
document that DACC have the effect of signifi- 
cantly increasing the incidence of small positive 
earnings levels, changes and surprises. DACC also 
have the effect of reducing the incidence of both 
positive and negative earnings levels, changes and 
surprises of large magnitude. 
Further, we report evidence that exact zero earn- 
ings surprises are associated with unusual variance 
in DACC, suggesting idiosyncratic use of DACC 
to meet forecasts exactly. We also find that exact 
zero earnings surprises are associated with rela- 
tively low average extraordinary items, high inci- 
dence of negative extraordinary items, and low 
incidence of positive extraordinary items. This re- 
sult is consistent with exact zero earnings surpris- 
es being achieved with the aid of misclassification 
of extraordinary items. 
The main contributions of this paper can be sum- 
marised as follows. Firstly, we provide a previous- 
ly undocumented general empirical explanation of 
the discontinuity observed at zero in the distribu- 
tion of earnings relative to targets. Specifically, we 
report that accounting manipulation by the gener- 
ality of (non-financial) companies through DACC 
is a significant contributor to this discontinuity. 
Secondly, we quantify the extent to which firms 
achieve earnings targets with the aid of DACC. 
The paper thus also contributes further to the 
methodological debate by providing support for 
the use of DACC as a proxy for earnings manage- 
ment. However, this evidence also indicates that 
the extent to which, and direction in which, firms 
use DACC to manage earnings varies with the re- 
lationship between earnings before DACC and 
basic earnings targets. This has implications for 
the interpretation of previous studies, and design 
of future studies, using DACC to proxy for earn- 
ings management. The evidence we report also 
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contributes to the literature examining the circum- 
stances under which firms seek to manage earn- 
ings (e.g., Nelson et al. 2003). 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
discontinuities would be consistent with, but not 
necessarily proof of, earnings management to 
achieve targets. Thus, we test the following predic- 
tion: 
H1: The frequency of small negative earnings 
levels (changes, surprises) is lower than ex- 
pected and the frequency of small positive 
earnings levels (changes, surprises) is higher 
than expected under a smooth distribution6 
To the extent that DACC cause the discontinuity 
in the earnings distribution, the removal of DACC 
from earnings is expected to reduce the discontinu- 
ity. Specifically, we predict that the distributions of 
non-discretionary earnings do not display disconti- 
nuities around earnings targets, and test the fol- 
lowing prediction: 
H2: The frequencies of small negative non-dis- 
cretionary earnings levels (changes, surpris- 
es) and small positive non-discretionary 
earnings levels (changes, surprises) are equal 
to the frequencies expected under a smooth 
distribution 
Further, the use of DACC to achieve targets will 
be reflected in DACC having the effect of increas- 
ing the proportion of firm-years achieving earn- 
ings targets. This implies the following prediction: 
H3: The proportion of firm-years with positive 
earnings levels (changes, surprises) is larger 
than the proportion of firm-years with posi- 
tive non-discretionary earnings levels 
(changes, surprises) 
The previous evidence on the distribution of 
earnings relative to targets suggests that earnings 
management to achieve targets occurs most exten- 
sively when the shortfall from target is small. In 
particular, it is suggested that firms seek to manage 
earnings to transform small deficits into small sur- 
pluses relative to targets. Thus, we test the follow- 
ing predictions: 
2. Research design 
Prior research has typically approached the ques- 
tion of whether firms use DACC to achieve earn- 
ings targets by examining average DACC 
conditional on either earnings or non-discretionary 
earnings relative to target. For example, DeFond 
and Park (1999) report that firms use DACC to 
achieve earnings in excess of forecasts by 2 to 3 
cents per share. They find that DACC are income- 
increasing on average if the earnings surprise is 
less than 2 cents, income-decreasing if the earn- 
ings surprise is more than 3 cents, and insignifi- 
cantly different from zero if the earnings surprise 
is 2 or 3 cents. Cheng (2000) also investigates the 
relationship between DACC and earnings surpris- 
es and observes that firms with non-discretionary 
earnings below forecasts report positive DACC on 
average, while firms with non-discretionary earn- 
ings above forecasts report negative DACC on av- 
erage. This approach does not address the extent to 
which DACC are used successfully to manage 
earnings from below to above targets. It also does 
not answer the question of whether the discontinu- 
ity in the distribution of earnings relative to targets 
is specifically caused by DACC. If earnings man- 
agement underpins observed discontinuities in 
earnings distributions, then earnings management 
should be used by more firms to move from below 
to above target than in the opposite direction. The 
finding that firms with small profits have higher 
DACC than firms with small losses does not pro- 
vide such a demonstration. It is possible that at 
least as many firms move from non-discretionary 
(pre-managed) profits to reported (post-managed) 
losses as move from non-discretionary losses to re- 
ported profits while at the same time finding that 
firms with non-discretionary profits (losses) have 
negative (positive) DACC. 
We first examine whether earnings levels, 
changes and surprises are distributed with a dis- 
continuity at zero, similar to Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999). Such 
For the purpose of efficient expression, we use the terms 
negative and positive to describe earnings and non-discre- 
tionary earnings relative to target. Strictly, our usage of 
positive (negative) in the context of earnings levels, non-dis- 
cretionary earnings levels, earnings changes and non-discre- 
tionary earnings changes refers to observations greater than 
(less than or equal to) zero. Our usage of positive (negative) in 
the context of earnings surprises and non-discretionary earn- 
ings surprises refers to observations greater than or equal to 
(less than) zero. This is in accordance with our assumption 
that firms seek to achieve positive earnings levels and changes 
and avoid negative earnings surprises, and with the conse- 
quential design of our empirical tests. 
H4: 
H5: 
The proportion of firm-years with small pos- 
itive earnings levels (changes, surprises) is 
larger than the proportion of firm-years with 
small positive non-discretionary earnings 
levels (changes, surprises) 
The proportion of firm-years with small neg- 
ative earnings levels (changes, surprises) is 
smaller than the proportion of firm-years 
with small negative non-discretionary earn- 
ings levels (changes, surprises) 
One important caveat must be noted with respect 
to the last prediction. It is based on the assumed 
earnings management objectives of achieving pos- 
itive earnings levels and changes and avoiding 
negative earnings surprises. It does not take ac- 
count of other earnings management strategies, 
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e.g., reducing the magnitude of earnings changes 
or surprises, which firms might simultaneously 
pursue. This would have implications for H5. 
Specifically, the use of DACC to smooth income 
might result in DACC increasing the proportion of 
firm-years with small negative earnings changes 
and reducing the proportion of firm-years with 
large negative earnings changes. We regard the 
question of whether firms use DACC to dampen 
earnings levels, changes or surprises as an empiri- 
cal issue to be taken into account when presenting 
and discussing our results. 
127 
that classification of extraordinary items can be 
used as a means to manage earnings before ex- 
traordinary items makes it especially interesting to 
study whether DACC are also used to manage this 
earnings measure. For completeness, we also re- 
port evidence on pre- and post-FRS 3 periods, on 
using earnings after extraordinary items (EAXI) 
and on the use of extraordinary and special items 
to achieve earnings targets (see Section 5) .  
For the purposes of tests on earnings surprises, 
we obtain actual and forecasted earnings from 
I/B/E/S." We restrict the sample to those consen- 
sus forecasts based on at least three individual 
forecasts, and use the median forecast from the last 
available month before the earnings announce- 
ment as the proxy for forecasted earnings. We re- 
quire at least three individual forecasts so as to 
ensure that the median is a reliable measure.14 We 
use the median instead of the mean so as to min- 
imise the effect of individual forecasts with unusu- 
al errors having excessive influence on the 
3. Sample and data 
We test the above empirical predictions, and pro- 
vide related evidence, on a sample comprising all 
UK quoted non-financial firms over the years 1989 
to 1998.' We exclude financial firms because of 
our interest in working capital accruals, the accru- 
al generating process being considerably different 
in financial firms (Peasnell et al., 2000:318). We 
further restrict the sample to accounting periods of 
approximately one year in duration, defined as not 
less than 350 or more than 380 days. We impose 
this requirement because accounting flow vari- 
ables such as earnings are incomparable if they re- 
late to periods of different duration.8 
Our primary data source for tests on earnings 
levels and changes is Datastream. For these tests, 
we measure earnings (EARN) in a hybrid manner 
across implementation of an important UK report- 
ing standard, FRS 3.9 In pre-FRS 3 accounting pe- 
riods, we measure EARN as earnings before 
extraordinary items. In post-FRS 3 accounting 
periods, we measure EARN as earnings before ex- 
traordinary and special or non-operating excep- 
tional items.'O The special items we exclude are 
items that could have been extraordinary pre-FRS 
3,  are exceptional post-FRS 3 ,  and are required by 
FRS 3 to be disclosed separately on the face of the 
income statement." We measure scaled earnings 
level (E) as EARN,/TA,-I, and scaled earnings 
change (AE) as (EARN, - EARN,-I)/TA,-I. 
Our analysis of earnings before extraordinary 
items is consistent with Degeorge et al. (1999) but 
contrasts with Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) who 
examine earnings after extraordinary items. 
Theory is unclear about which earnings measure 
managers seek to manipulate, or how this measure 
is identified. We focus on earnings before extraor- 
dinary items because the investment analyst com- 
munity would appear to make wider use of 
earnings measured before extraordinary items.I2 
This increases the incentive for firms to manage 
earnings before extraordinary items relative to 
basic targets. Further, there is UK evidence that 
earnings before extraordinary items is less timely 
in reflecting bad news than earnings after extraor- 
dinary items (Pope and Walker, 1999). The fact 
'We use Datastream live and dead UK quoted equity lists, 
UKQl and DEADUK. These lists are based on issued securi- 
ties and include a number of instances where individual firms 
are listed more than once as a result of multiple issues. We 
identify these cases and retain in the sample only one equity 
class per firm-year. 
' Of our final earnings level sample of 10,197 firm-years, 
1561 (15.3%) observations have less than 365 or more than 
366 days. 
FRS 3 was issued on 29 October 1992, voluntary compli- 
ance being immediately optional and mandatory compliance 
required in relation to accounting periods ending on or after 22 
June 1993. FRS 3 redefined ordinary and extraordinary activ- 
ities with the effect of abolishing extraordinary items in the 
UK. 
lo Our pre-FRS 3 EARN is Datastream account code 
(DS) 625, and our post-FRS 3 EARN i s  DS625-(DS1083- 
DS1094-DS1097). We measure other variables in terms of 
Datastream account codes as follows. WCA is A(DS376- 
DS375)-A(DS389-DS309), REV is DS 104, TA is DS392, XI is 
DS193 and SI is DS1083-DS1094-DS1097. 
" These items, listed in para. 20 of FRS 3, are profits or 
losses on sale or termination of operations, costs of fundamen- 
tal reorganisations or restructuring, and profits or losses on 
sale of fixed assets. Ernst & Young (1999) uses the terminolo- 
gy non-operating exceptional to describe these items. 
Exclusion of these items from our post-FRS 3 measure of 
earnings closely resembles the adjustments made by Lin and 
Walker (2000) in their post-FRS 3 construct of headline eam- 
ings. 
'' I/B/E/S International Inc. (1996:6) points out that ana- 
lysts generally make forecasts of earnings on a continuing 
basis, i.e., excluding extraordinary and other non-operating 
items. Similarly, SIP 1 (1993) excludes extraordinary and sev- 
eral other non-maintainable items from the definition of head- 
line earnings. Lin and Walker (2000) report that, in terms of 
explaining stock prices, headline or maintainable earnings per- 
forms generally better than FRS 3 earnings, which includes 
non-operating exceptional or formerly extraordinary items. 
l 3  We only have access to YB/E/S data for 1990 onwards. 
Perhaps because of this and contrary to Brown and Higgins 
(2001). we do not find a time-dependent bias in the occurrence 
of exact forecasts. 
'' The median forecast horizon, i.e. period between fore- 
casts and earnings announcements, is 28 days 
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128 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Panel A 
Earnings level sample 
N=10,197 
Et 0.055 0.062 0.101 0.024 0.089 
NDE, 0.055 0.059 0.1 17 4 .oo 1 0.114 
DACC, 0 .ooo 0.000 0.039 -0.040 0.078 
Mean Median Q3 Ql Std. Dev. 
Panel B 
Earnings change sample 
N= 10,209 
AEt 0.007 0.008 0.028 -0.014 0.063 
DACC, 0 .ooo 0 .ooo 0.039 -0.04 1 0.078 
Mean Median Q3 Ql Std. Dev. 
NDAE, 0.007 0.005 0.055 4.045 0.100 
Panel C 
Earnings surprise sample 
N=4,380 
ES, 4.001 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.013 
NDES, 0.002 0.002 0.034 -0.030 0.060 
DACC, 4.003 4.002 0.029 4.034 0.058 
Mean Median Q3 Ql Std. Dev. 
E = Earnings scaled by opening total assets 
NDE = Non-discretionary earnings scaled by opening total assets 
AE = Change in earnings scaled by opening total assets 
NDAE = Non-discretionary earnings change in earnings scaled by opening total assets 
ES = Earnings surprise scaled by opening total assets 
NDES = Non-discretionary earnings surprise scaled by opening total assets 
DACC = Discretionary working capital accruals scaled by opening total assets, estimated using Jones (1991) 
model 
measure of central tendency. Thus, we measure the 
earnings surprise (ES) as actual earnings minus the 
median forecast scaled by opening TA. 
We estimate DACC by applying a cross-section- 
l5  Collins and Hribar (2002) express the concern that meas- 
uring accruals as the change in balance sheet accounts intro- 
duces measurement error into total accruals, primarily as a 
result of mergers, acquisitions and discontinued operations. 
They state that the error in total accruals measured through the 
balance sheet approach is unlikely to be correlated with the as- 
sumed drivers of accruals in the Jones (1991) model, resulting 
in the measurement error being captured entirely by the resid- 
ual or discretionary accruals estimate. We believe their conjec- 
ture on the correlation between the measurement error and 
change in revenue, in particular, is counter-intuitive. Change 
in total consolidated revenue is, a priori, no less susceptible to 
influence by mergers, acquisitions and discontinued opera- 
tions than change in working capital balances. In any case, 
measuring total accruals using the cash flow statement, which 
is the approach preferred by Collins and Hribar (2002), is it- 
self not unproblematic. The difference between operating 
profit and operating cash flow usually includes a number of 
idiosyncratic accruals that cannot be classified systematically 
as either discretionary or non-discretionary. 
a1 version of the Jones (1991) model to working 
capital accruals. Under this model, normal or non- 
discretionary accruals are assumed to be a function 
of designated factors or drivers. The component of 
accruals not explained by these drivers is denoted 
as abnormal or discretionary. In the original Jones 
(1991) formulation, total accruals are modeled as a 
function of the change in total sales (AREV) and 
gross property, plant and equipment (PPE). The 
former is argued to drive short term accruals or 
WCA and the latter to drive long term accruals, 
most notably depreciation. 
Our focus is on the discretionary component of 
WCA. We believe that long term accruals such as 
depreciation are unlikely to be an effective means 
of managing earnings given their visibility and the 
ability of the market to observe, and unwind the 
earnings implications of, any attempt to manipu- 
late them (Young 1999:842). We measure total 
WCA as the change in non-cash working ~apita1.I~ 
We then estimate the following cross-sectional 
OLS regression for each Datastream level-6 indus- 
try-year, using all valid firm-years with available 
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data but requiring a minimum of six observations 
per regression:16 
W C A ~ ~ , / T A l j f - ! =  hJf+ ~ l J f A R E V I J f / T A I J f - ~ + E I J ,  ( l )  
where i, j and t are firm, industry and time sub- 
scripts respectively. This regression facilitates par- 
titioning of WCA into non-discretionary accruals 
(NDACC) and DACC. NDACC are measured as 
the predicted component of WCA and DACC as 
the residual resulting from this regression. Thus: 
DACCIJ,= WCAIJ,/TAlJt I - NDACC,, (2 )  
= WCAIJl/ TAIJf- I - (boJl + b I JI mEVIJ,/ TAIJl- I 
where 6, and P I  are the industry-year OLS param- 
eters estimated above. 
In our use of the Jones (199 1) model rather than 
available alternatives, we are guided by Peasnell et 
al. (2000). They evaluate the specification and 
power of alternative methods of estimating DACC 
using UK data. The results they report suggest 
that, on the whole, alternative models currently 
available are not superior to the Jones (1991) 
model in terms of ability to detect plausible levels 
of earnings management. Our measure of WCA 
and the DACC estimation technique closely re- 
semble those used by Peasnell et al. (2000). 
Having estimated DACC as described above, we 
measure non-discretionary earnings (NDE), non- 
discretionary earnings change (NDAE) and non- 
discretionary earnings surprise (NDES) as 
E-DACC, AE-DACC and ES-DACC respectively. 
Our earnings levels tests are conducted on an earn- 
ings level sample defined as all observations from 
the above-described main sample for which E, 
NDE and DACC are available, and having deleted 
the extreme%iles of E, NDE and DACC. Our earn- 
ings change and surprise samples are defined in a 
similar manner, with E (NDE) being replaced by 
AE (NDAE) and ES (NDES) respectively. 
These criteria result in earnings level, change 
and surprise samples of 10,197, 10,209 and 4,380 
observations respectively. Basic descriptive statis- 
tics on these samples are presented in Table 1. 
Mean (median) E, AE and ES are 0.055 (0.062), 
0.007 (0.008) and -4.001 (0.001) for the earnings 
level, change and surprise samples respectively. As 
expected, mean (median) DACC is zero (zero) for 
both the earnings level and change ~amp1es.l~ 
129 
However, the earnings surprise sample has mean 
(median) DACC of -0.003 (4,002). 
l6 DeFond and Jiambalvo ( I  994) and Young (1999) also re- 
quire a minimum of six observations. 
l7 Given that DACC is estimated as an OLS residual, the 
population average is zero by construction. 
The high frequencies shown in the extreme upper and 
lower bins in all panels of Figure 1 are a result of truncating 
the range of the graphs and combining the remaining bins. 
l9 We use increasingly narrow bands or bin widths as we 
move from earnings levels to changes to surprises because of 
the degree of concentration around zero in these respective 
distributions. 
4. Results 
4.1.  Distribution of earnings and 
non-discretionary earnings relative to target 
We predict in H 1 that earnings relative to targets 
will be distributed discontinuously around zero, 
consistent with firms managing earnings to avoid 
small deficits and achieve small surpluses. We fur- 
ther predict in H2 that the exclusion of discre- 
tionary accruals from current period earnings will 
cause the discontinuity around zero to disappear. 
The evidence on these hypotheses is reported in 
Figure 1 and Table 2. Figure 1 presents histograms 
of reported and non-discretionary earnings levels, 
changes and surprises. It also shows the differ- 
ences between the frequency of reported earnings 
and non-discretionary earnings relative to target in 
each class, thus illustrating the impact that DACC 
have on the distribution of earnings relative to tar- 
gets.I8 Table 2 reports the Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) standardised difference statistics relating to 
the classes at both immediate sides of zero in the 
distributions reported in Figure 1 . I 9  
The distribution of earnings levels, shown in 
Figure 1 Panel A1 reveals a distinct discontinuity 
at zero. The frequency at the immediate left of zero 
is low and that on the immediate right of zero is 
high relative to expected frequencies under a 
smooth distribution. As predicted, Panel A2 shows 
that the distribution of non-discretionary earnings 
levels is relatively smooth around zero. There is 
little disparity between the frequencies immediate- 
ly adjacent to zero. Panel A3 confirms that DACC 
have the effect of increasing the frequency of 
small positive earnings and decreasing the fre- 
quency of small negative earnings. In addition, 
DACC have the effect of reducing the frequency 
of both large positive and large negative earnings. 
Table 2 Panels A1 and A2 confirm the visual im- 
pressions regarding the impact of DACC around 
zero earnings. Panel A1 indicates that the actual 
frequency of the class to the immediate left of zero 
in the earnings distribution is significantly less 
than the expected frequency of that class under the 
null hypothesis of a smooth distribution. On the 
other hand, Panel A2 indicates that the actual fre- 
quency of the class to the immediate left of zero in 
the non-discretionary earnings distribution is in- 
significantly different from its expected frequency. 
This confirms our H1 and H2 predictions that 
earnings is distributed discontinuously around 
zero, while non-discretionary earnings is not. 
Figure 1 Panel B1 shows the distribution of 
earnings changes. This histogram reveals a discon- 
tinuity at zero, caused by the frequency at the im- 
mediate right of zero appearing to be higher and 
that at the immediate left of zero lower than ex- 
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Figure 1 (Panel A) 
Histograms of earnings and non-discretionary earnings levels 
Panel A1 Earnings levels 
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800 
7w - 
ua 
z 
YK) 
2ca 
lw 
0 
Panel A3 Difference in frequency of earnings and non-discretionary earnings level 
ua 
CLASS MAX 
N= 10,197 Class width 0.01 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 19
:03
 29
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
3 
Vol. 37 No. 2. 2007 131 
Figure 1 (Panel B) 
Histograms of earnings and non-discretionary earnings changes 
Panel B1 Earnings changes 
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Panel B2 Non-discretionary earnings changes 
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Figure 1 (Panel C) 
Histograms of earnings and non-discretionary earnings surprises 
Panel C1 Earnings surprises 
24.20 
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Panel C2 Non-discretionary earnings surprises 
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Table 2 
Distribution of near-zero earnings and non-discretionary earnings relative to targets 
Panel A1 
Earnings level 
N= 10.1 97 
Panel A2 
Non-discretionary earnings level 
N= 10,197 
Class -0.0 I <E,sO O<E,sO .O I Class -0 .O 1 <NDE,sO O<NDE,sO.O 1 
n 190 356 n 300 325 
Std. Diff. -3.516 1.942 Std. Diff. -0.144 -1.144 
p value 0.000 0.052 p value 0.885 0.253 
Panel B1 
Earnings change 
N=10,209 
Panel B2 
Non-discretionary earnings change 
N= 10,209 
Class 4.005<AEIs0 O<AE,sO .005 Class 4 .OOkNDAE,sO O<NDAE,sO.OOS 
n 503 763 n 286 289 
Std. Diff. -3.380 2.463 Std. Diff. -0.538 -0.705 
p value 0.001 0.014 p value 0.590 0.48 I 
Panel C1 
Earnings surprise 
N=4,380 
Panel C2 
Non-discretionary earnings surprise 
N=4,380 
Class -0.0025sES1<0 OsES,<0.0025 Class 4.0025sNDES1<O OsNDES,<O.0025 
n 734 1415 I7 98 1 1 1  
Std. Dix. -3.442 2 1.225 Std. Diff. -0.209 1.085 
p value 0 .oo 1 0.000 p value 0.835 0.278 
a E  = Earnings scaled by opening total assets 
NDE = Non-discretionary earnings scaled by opening total assets 
AE = Change in earnings scaled by opening total assets 
NDAE = Non-discretionary earnings change in earnings scaled by opening total assets 
ES = Earnings surprise scaled by opening total assets 
NDES = Non-discretionary earnings surprise scaled by opening total assets 
DACC = Discretionary working capital accruals scaled by opening total assets, estimated using Jones 
(1991) model 
b This table shows the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) standardised difference statistic for the classes at the 
immediate left and right of zero in the distributions of actual and non-discretionary earnings levels, changes 
and surprises scaled by opening total assets. This statistic is measured as the difference between the actual 
and expected frequencies in the class concerned, standardised by the standard deviation of this difference. 
The expected frequency of each class is assumed to be the mean of the two immediately adjacent classes. 
In other words, if the number of observations in class i is denoted by ni, the probability of an observation 
occurring in class i denoted by pi, and the total number of observations in the sample denoted by N, the test 
statistic for class i is given by: 
c This statistic is evaluated against the standardised normal distribution. 
d All p values reported are two-tailed 
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pected. As predicted, the distribution of non-dis- 
cretionary earnings changes shown in Panel B2 
does not have a similar discontinuity at zero. The 
frequencies at the immediate sides of zero appear 
indistinguishable from each other, and the entire 
distribution appears symmetrical around zero. The 
distribution of actual earnings changes has rela- 
tively heavy density over a range of small positive 
earnings changes. Panel B3 shows that DACC 
have the effect of increasing the frequency of 
small positive earnings changes, increasing the 
frequency of small negative earnings changes to a 
lesser extent, and reducing the frequency of large 
positive and negative earnings changes. 
Evidence confirming our H 1 and H2 predictions 
regarding the effect of DACC on the discontinuity 
in the distribution of earnings changes is presented 
in Table 2. Panel B 1 indicates that the frequency of 
the class to the immediate left of zero in the earn- 
ings change distribution is significantly less than 
expected had the distribution been smooth. 
However, this is not the case in the distribution of 
non-discretionary earnings changes. Panel B2 
shows that the frequency to the immediate left of 
zero is insignificantly different from that expected 
under a smooth distribution. 
In Figure 1 Panel C1, we present the distribution 
of earnings surprises. This distribution reveals 
high concentration around zero, with more than 
85% of all firm-years reporting earnings surprises 
within a 1.25% of TA band around zero. 
Consistent with our H1 prediction the frequency to 
the immediate right of zero is markedly greater 
than that at the immediate left of zero. Panel C2 re- 
ports the distribution of non-discretionary earnings 
surprises, with little observable disparity between 
frequencies immediately either side of zero. This 
distribution is dispersed over a wide range, consis- 
tent with DACC being used to manage earnings to- 
wards forecast and with analysts anticipating a 
significant part of DACC. This is confirmed in 
Panel C3, which indicates that DACC have the ef- 
fect of causing convergence of earnings and fore- 
casts. Specifically, DACC increase the frequency 
of small magnitude surprises and reduce the fre- 
quency of large magnitude surprises. It is also 
clear from this panel that DACC increase the fre- 
quency of small positive surprises to a greater ex- 
tent than small negative surprises. 
Table 2 Panel C1 confirms that the frequency of 
the class to the immediate left of zero in the earn- 
ings surprise distribution is significantly less than 
expected under the null hypothesis of a smooth 
distribution. In contrast, the actual frequency of 
this class in the non-discretionary earnings sur- 
prise distribution (Panel C2) is insignificantly dif- 
ferent from the expected frequency. This is 
consistent with our H1 and H2 predictions that 
earnings surprises are distributed discontinuously 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
around zero while non-discretionary earnings sur- 
prises are not. 
In summary, therefore, we find that earnings lev- 
els, changes and surprises are distributed with vis- 
ible and statistically significant discontinuities 
around zero. Specifically, in each of these distribu- 
tions, the frequency to the immediate right of zero 
is greater than expected and the frequency to the 
immediate left of zero lower than expected under a 
smooth distribution. We find, further, that the dis- 
tributions of non-discretionary earnings levels, 
changes and surprises are not discontinuous in this 
manner around zero. This suggests that the discon- 
tinuity in the distribution of earnings relative to 
basic targets is caused by DACC. 
4.2.  Proportions ofBrm-years achieving and 
missing earnings targets as a result of DACC 
We predict in H3 that DACC have the effect of 
increasing the proportion of firm-years reporting 
positive earnings levels, changes and surprises. We 
further predict in H4 and H5 that DACC increase 
the proportion of small positive earnings levels, 
changes and surprises, and reduce the proportion 
of small negative earnings levels, changes and sur- 
prises. These predictions are based on the hypoth- 
esised use of DACC to achieve basic earnings 
targets. 
Preliminary evidence on these predictions is ob- 
tained from Figure 1 as discussed above. This fig- 
ure indicates that DACC increase the proportion of 
positive and, particularly, small positive earnings 
levels, changes and surprises, consistent with pre- 
diction. Also consistent with prediction, DACC re- 
duce the proportion of small negative earnings 
levels. However, contrary to prediction, DACC in- 
crease the proportion of small negative earnings 
changes and surprises. While the graphical evi- 
dence in Figure l clearly illustrates the effects of 
DACC, it does not indicate the statistical signifi- 
cance of these effects. 
Table 3 reports the results of formal tests of the 
predictions we make in H3, H4 and H5. Panel A 
shows that DACC (which are mean zero: see foot- 
note 17) have the effect of significantly increasing 
the proportion of positive earnings levels from 
74.8 to 85.2%. DACC also significantly change 
the proportions of firm-years with positive and 
negative earnings levels within 0.05 of opening 
TA. In the case of positive earnings levels within 
this range, the proportion increases from 20.8 to 
26.4%. In the case of negative earnings levels 
within the same range, the proportion decreases 
from 12.1 to 6.5%. These changes are consistent 
with the prediction that DACC are used to manage 
earnings to achieve positive earnings levels and, in 
particular, to transform small negative earnings 
into small positive earnings. 
Table 4 shows the impact of DACC in arriving at 
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Table 3 
Proportions of observations achieving and missing earnings targets before and after discretionary accruals 
Panel A 
Earnings levels 
N= 10,197 
Proportion Z p value 
NDE,>O 
ESO 
0.748 
0.852 25.718 0.000 
O<NDE,sO.OS 
O<E,s0.05 
0.208 
0.264 10.832 0.000 
0.121 
0.065 
- -15.075 0.000 
Panel B 
Earnings changes 
N=10,209 
Proportion Z p value 
NDAE,>O 
AE,A 
0.527 
0.626 18.480 0.000 
O<NDAE,s0.025 
O<AE,s0.025 
0.144 
0.353 38.461 0 .ooo 
0.137 
0.186 10.170 0 .ooo 
Panel C 
Earnings surprises 
N=4,380 
Proportioil Z p value 
NDES,rO 
ES,rO 
0.5 I8 
0.593 7.168 0 .ooo 
OsNDES,<O.O I25 
OsES,<O.O 125 
0.108 
0.553 51.101 0.000 
24.647 0.000 -O.O125sNDES,<O 0.108 -0.0125sES,<O 0.317 
a E  = Earnings scaled by opening total assets 
NDE = Non-discretionary earnings scaled by opening total assets 
AE = Change in earnings scaled by opening total assets 
NDAE = Non-discretionary earnings change in earnings scaled by opening total assets 
ES = Earnings surprise scaled by opening total assets 
NDES = Non-discretionary earnings surprise scaled by opening total assets 
DACC = Discretionary working capital accruals scaled by opening total assets, estimated using Jones 
b This table evaluates the impact of DACC on the frequency of observations of positive, small positive and 
small negative earnings levels, changes and surprises. The Z statistic shown relates to the Z test for corre- 
lated proportions described by Kanji (1993,4849) .  This test evaluates the impact of a given intervention 
on the proportion of observations satisfying a given criterion by measuring and comparing the proportion 
before and after the intervention. If the number of observations moving from no to yes relative to the crite- 
rion of interest is denoted by b, the number moving from yes to no denoted by c ,  and the total number of 
observations denoted by N, the test statistic is given by: 
(1991) model 
( h  - c )  / N 
( h + c , ) - ( h - c , ) 2 / N  dN(N - I )  
c This statistic is evaluated against the standardised normal distribution. 
d All p values reported are two-tailed. 
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the earnings reported by firms. It takes the form of 
transition matrices (one each for levels, changes 
and surprises): rows show broad classes of non- 
discretionary (pre-managed) earnings, columns 
show such classes of reported earnings. 
Intersections of rows and columns show the num- 
ber of firm-years (and proportion of the total) 
moving from a particular NDE, (NDAE,, NDES,) 
class to a particular E, (AE,, ES,) class. 
Panel A presents details of the frequency with 
which firms move from specific classes of non- 
discretionary earnings, e.g . NDE I -0.1, to specif- 
ic classes of actual reported earnings, e.g. 0 < E, I 
0.05. We would expect that firms use DACC to 
move from negative non-discretionary earnings to 
positive reported earnings, and for this to be par- 
ticularly so for firm-years close to targets. Panel A 
reveals that 14% of the entire sample move from 
negative non-discretionary earnings to positive 
earnings as a result of DACC. This compares to 
only 3.6% of the sample moving in the opposite 
direction, i.e. from positive non-discretionary 
earnings to negative earnings as a result of 
DACC?O thus emphasising the directionality in the 
use of DACC. Focusing specifically on those firms 
falling just short of target, i.e. in the range -0.05 < 
NDE, I 0, the effect is even more pronounced: 
72.8% of such firms report positive actual (post 
DACC) earnings ((550 + 261 + 88) / 1,235), 
whereas only 11 . l% of those firms with NDE, just 
above break even, i.e. 0 <NDE, 10.05, move to 
negative earnings ((20 +49 + 166) / 2,117). Of par- 
ticular interest is the movement of firms closest to 
break even. Here 5.4% of the entire sample moves 
from negative non-discretionary earnings within 
0.05 of opening TA to positive earnings within the 
same range, (i.e. the 550 firm-years in the lower 
left comer of the upper right quadrant). Although 
only a small proportion of the total sample, these 
550 firm-years represent 44.5% of the 1,235 firm- 
years within this range. 
Table 4 Panel B reports the impact of DACC on 
the proportion of firm-years achieving and missing 
positive earnings changes. DACC significantly in- 
crease the proportion of firm-years achieving pos- 
itive earnings changes from 52.7% based on 
NDAE, to 62.6% based on reported earnings, i.e. 
row totals 1,473 + 1,161 + 2,742 as a proportion of 
the total of 10,209 compared to the proportion rep- 
resented by the column totals 3,606 + 1,484 + 
1,299. As with earnings levels, focusing specifical- 
ly on those firms falling just short of target, i.e. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
-0.025 < NDAE, I 0, reveals that 58.5% of such 
firms report positive actual (post DACC) earnings 
changes ((629 + 126 + 61) / 1,395, whereas only 
29% of those firms with NDAE, just above target, 
i.e. 0 < NDAE, 10.025, move to negative actual 
earnings changes ((49 + 80 + 298) / 1,473), again 
confirming a clear directional bias in movements. 
DACC also significantly increase the proportion 
of firm-years with small positive earnings 
changes, i.e. within 0.025 of opening TA from 14.4 
to 35.3%, i.e. row total of 1,473 for 0 < NDAE, 
50.025 compared to column total of 3,606 for 0 < 
AE, 50.025. 
These results are consistent with DACC being 
used to achieve positive earnings changes. 
However, contrary to prediction, DACC signifi- 
cantly increase the proportion of negative earnings 
changes within 0.025 of opening TA from 13.7% 
(row total of 1,395 for -0.025 < NDAE, I 0 to 
18.6% (equivalent AE, column total of 1,903). This 
result reflects the visual impression conveyed by 
Figure 1. 
One potential reason for DACC increasing the 
proportion of firm-years with small negative earn- 
ings changes is the use of DACC to smooth earn- 
ings. Smoothing would be reflected by the use of 
DACC to dampen fluctuations in earnings, i.e., to 
reduce the magnitude of earnings changes. Table 4 
Panel B shows that 789 (i.e. 468 + 321), or 41.5%, 
of the 1,903 firm-years with actual negative earn- 
ings changes within 0.025 of opening TA use 
DACC to reduce the magnitude of a larger nega- 
tive earnings change. If these observations were 
excluded, the proportion of firm-years with small 
negative earnings change would move from 13.7 
(row total, as before) to 10.9% (the -0.025 < AE, 
I) column total of 1,903 minus the 789 firm-years 
specified above) as a result of DACC. In other 
words, if firm-years dampening the magnitude of 
large negative earnings change are excluded, 
DACC have the effect of reducing the proportion 
of firm-years with small negative earnings 
changes, as predicted. 
It is important to note that, even if firm-years 
dampening the magnitude of large positive earn- 
ings change are excluded, DACC still have the 
predicted effect of increasing the proportion of 
firm-years with small positive earnings changes. 
In this case, the proportion concerned increases 
from 14.4 to 22.3% (compare row total of 1,473 as 
before with column total 3,606 minus 789 + 543, 
the firms reducing large NDE changes by the use 
of DACC) . 
Table 4 Panel B also indicates that 20.2% of the 
entire sample use DACC to move from negative to 
positive earnings changes, i.e. the cases in the top 
right-hand quadrant. These 2,059 firm-years repre- 
sent 42.6% of all firm-years with negative non-dis- 
cretionary earnings changes, i.e. 2,059 as a 
2o The 14 % comprise those observations in the upper right 
quadrant of the panel, i.e., those firms having negative NDE 
but reporting positive E (I13 + 191 + 550 + 65 + 84 +2 61 + 
42 + 36 + 88) / 10197. The 3.6 % comprise those observations 
in the lower left quadrant, i t .  those having positive NDE but 
reporting negative E (20 + 7 + 7 + 49 + I4 + I3 + I66 + 5 7+ 
39) / 10197. 
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Table 4 
'kansition matrices indicating the frequency of movement of observations from classes of 
non-discretionary earnings to classes of earnings relative to target 
Panel A 
Earnings level sample 
N D W . 1  362 88 j 113 65 
E@.I -O.I<E,s4.05 4.05<E,d ~ O<E$.05 0.05<E,d.I 
0.006 
82 I 
0.036 0 SiQ9 0.008 j 0.011 
4.I<NDE,sO.O5 59 98 110 ! , 191 84 
0.006 0.010 0.011 j 0.019 0.008 
4.05<NDE,d 47 82 207 j 550 26 1 
0.005 0.008 0.020 i 0.054 0.026 
0.002 0.005 0.016 0.094 0.074 
.......................... ~~ .......................................................... ~~ ......................................................................................................... 
O<NDE,d.OS 20 49 166 j 957 755 
O.OS<NDE,d. I 7 14 57 ~ 587 1248 
0.001 0.001 0.006 j 0.058 0.122 
NDEp3.I 7 I3 39 j 299 995 
0.001 0.001 0.004 1 0.029 0.098 
n 502 344 66 1 ! 2697 3408 
vromrtion 0.049 0.034 0.065 i 0.264 0.334 
F0.l Total 
42 752 
0.004 0.074 
36 578 
0 .004 0.057 
88 1235 
0.009 0.121 
I70 2117 
0.017 0.208 
432 2345 
0.042 0.230 
1817 3170 
0.178 0.31 I 
2585 10197 
0.254 1 
. .. .... . ..... ..... .... ..... .... .... .... . ... .... ..... .... 
Panel B 
Earnings change sample 
4 s O . 0 5  4.05<aE,~O.025 4.025&,d j 04E,d.025 0.025&$.05 AE9.05 Total 
NDAE+4.05 753 390 468 j 504 153 I07 2375 
0.074 0.038 0.046 ~ 0.049 0.015 0.010 0.233 
4.05<NDAEpX.025 I02 161 321 ! , 362 81 36 1063 
0.010 0.016 0.031 j 0.035 0.008 0.004 0.104 
4.025<NDAE$l 69 121 389 ~ , 629 I26 61 1395 
O&DAE,d.O25 49 80 298 j 779 21 I 56 1473 
0.005 0.008 0.029 j 0.076 0.021 0.005 0.144 
0.007 0.012 0.038 j 0.062 0.012 0.006 0.137 
............................................................. ~.. . ......................................................... ......... > ................................................................................................................. 
0.025<NDAE$l.05 28 54 196 1 543 250 90 1161 
0.003 0.005 0.019 j 0.053 0.024 0.009 0.114 
N D w . 0 5  48 62 231 ~ , 789 663 949 2742 
0.005 0.006 0.023 j 0.077 0.065 0.093 0.269 
n 1049 868 1903 3606 1484 I299 10209 
proportion 0.103 0.085 0.186 I 0.353 0.145 0.127 1 
Panel C 
Earnings surprise sample 
ES,<4.025 -0025&S,<4.0125 4).0125sES,<O i O&S,<O.O125 0.0125~ES,<O.025 ES@.O25 Total 
NDES,<-0025 93 65 398 j 642 28 8 1234 
0.021 0.015 0.091 ~ 0.147 0.006 0.002 0.282 
4.025dNDES,<4.0 I25 14 14 129 i 243 3 0 403 
4.0125WDES,d) 9 12 147 i , 290 12 4 474 
0.003 0.003 0.029 i 0.055 0.001 0 .W 0.092 
0 002 0.003 0.034 ! 0.066 0.003 0.001 0.108 
.......................................... ............................................................................................. > .............................. ~ .................................................................................. 
O&TDES,<O.OI 25 6 14 147 j 286 19 I 473 
0.001 0.003 0.034 i 0.065 0.004 0 .W 0.108 
0.0 I25sNDES,<O.025 5 12 123 j 281 I I  0 432 
0.001 0.003 0.028 i 0.064 0.003 O.Oo0 0.099 
NDES@.025 29 I20 445 I 
proportion 0.036 0.054 0.317 i 0.553 0.032 0.008 1 
~ 681 67 22 1364 
0.015 0.005 0.311 
n 156 237 1389 i 2423 1 4 0  35 4380 
0.007 0.027 0.101 j 0.155 
E = Earnings scaled by opening total assets 
NDE = Non-discretionary earnings scaled by opening total assets 
AE = Change in earnings scaled by opening total assets 
NDAE = Non-discretionary earnings change in earnings scaled by opening total assets 
FS = Earnings surprise scaled by opening total assets 
NDES = Non-discretionary earnings surprise scaled by opening total assets 
DACC = Discretionary working capital accruals scaled by opening total assets, estimated using Jones (1991) model 
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proportion of the relevant row totals of 2,375 + 
1,063 + 1,395. Again focusing specifically on 
those firms close to the target, in this case match- 
ing the prior year’s result; of the entire sample, 
6.2% of all firm-years move from negative non- 
discretionary earnings changes within 0.025 of 
opening TA to positive earnings changes within a 
similar range (i.e. the bottom left figure in the 
upper right quadrant). Of the 1,395 firm-years with 
small negative non-discretionary earnings changes 
within this range, 58.5% actually report positive 
earnings changes with the aid of DACC ((629 + 
126 + 61) / 1,395). 
In a similar manner, in Table 4 Panel C, we as- 
sess the impact of DACC on the proportion of 
firm-years meeting and missing analyst forecasts. 
This panel indicates that DACC significantly in- 
crease the proportion of firm-years with positive 
earnings surprises from 51.8 to 59.3%, i.e. the row 
totals 473 + 432 + 1,364 (being the firm-years with 
NDES above zero) compared to the column totals 
2,423 + 140 + 35 (the firm-years with ES above 
zero), both totals being divided by 4,380. 
Strikingly, and in accordance with our prediction, 
DACC greatly increase the proportion of firm- 
years with small positive earnings surprises, with- 
in 0 .O 125 of opening TA, from 10.8 to 55.3 % (i .e. 
the row total for 0 < NDES, s 0.0125 compared to 
the column total for 0 < ES, I 0.0125, However, 
contrary to prediction, DACC increase the propor- 
tion of firm-years with negative earnings surprises 
within a similar range from 10.8 to 31.7%. 
As suggested earlier for earnings, this last point 
is potentially explained by the use of DACC to re- 
duce the magnitude of large negative earnings sur- 
prises. Table 4 Panel C shows that DACC have the 
effect of facilitating 12% of the sample (398 + 
129) moving from a larger negative surprise to one 
within 0.0125 of opening TA. However, even if 
these observations are excluded, DACC still have 
the effect of increasing the proportion of small 
negative earnings surprises from 10.8% (the row 
total, as before) to 19.6% (the column total of 
1,389 minus 398 + 129), contrary to prediction. 
Clearly, however, the increase is less dramatic 
when these observations are excluded. 
Table 4 Panel C also indicates that 6.6% of the 
sample appears to use DACC to move from a neg- 
ative surprise within 0.0125 of opening TA to a 
positive surprise within the same range (the bot- 
tom left comer of the upper right quadrant). These 
290 cases represent 61.2% of all firm-years with 
negative non-discretionary earnings surprises 
within 0.0125 of opening TA (the row total of 
474). Further, 58.3% of all firm-years with nega- 
tive non-discretionary earnings surprises report 
positive actual surprises with the help of DACC, 
i.e. the total of firm-years in the upper right quad- 
rant divided by the sum of the row totals 1,234 + 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
403 + 474). 
In summary, DACC significantly increase the 
proportions of firm-years reporting positive earn- 
ings levels, changes and surprises, as predicted. 
DACC also have the effect of significantly in- 
creasing the proportion of firm-years reporting 
small positive earnings levels, changes and sur- 
prises, and reducing the proportion of firm-years 
reporting small negative earnings levels. This is 
consistent with DACC being used to achieve pos- 
itive earnings levels, changes and surprises, and 
with DACC causing the discontinuity in the distri- 
bution of earnings. However, contrary to predic- 
tion, DACC result in increases in the proportions 
of firm-years with small negative earnings 
changes and surprises. We show that this is main- 
ly because DACC also serves the purpose of 
dampening the magnitude of large negative earn- 
ings changes and surprises in significant numbers 
of firm-years. 
4.3. Sensitivity analysis 
To assess the robustness of our results to the 
choice of discretionary accruals model, we re-esti- 
mate non-discretionary earnings using five alter- 
native models and recompute the results reported 
in Figure 1 and Tables 2 , 3  and 4. We use two ver- 
sions of the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al, 
1995) based on working capital accruals and three 
others, versions of both the original Jones and the 
modified-Jones models, based on total accruals. 
The results achieved are consistent with those 
reported above. Examination of graphical repre- 
sentations of reported and non-discretionary earn- 
ings relative to targets, per Figure 1, confirms our 
main results. Examining the results statistically re- 
veals for reported earnings a discontinuity around 
zero in all 30 cases, i.e. five discretionary accruals 
models, each for levels, changes and surprises, ex- 
amining one bin either side of zero for each. For 
non-discretionary earnings, no statistically signifi- 
cant discontinuity is found in the 30 cases exam- 
ined except when using one of the total 
accruals-based modified-Jones models for surpris- 
es (below zero bin p value 0.085). We also achieve 
qualitatively similar results using market value of 
equity (rather than total assets) to scale the vari- 
ables in Equations I and 2. Further, our results for 
earnings surprises are again similar when using 
unscaled EPS (contrary to Durtschi and Easton’s 
(2005) suggestion). 
Replicating for earnings levels, changes and sur- 
prises the tests of proportion reported in Table 3, 
i.e. achieving and missing earnings targets, both 
overall and for each of small positive and small 
negative movements, reveals no instances contra- 
dicting the main results. Of 45 tests conducted 
(five discretionary accruals models, each for lev- 
els, changes and surprises, and each for overall, 
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small positive and small negative) only two give 
results with a p value other than 0.000 and these 
are each 0.005. 
It could be argued that our finding of the disap- 
pearance of the discontinuity around zero is a sta- 
tistical artefact deriving from our approach of 
removing DACC from reported earnings (changes, 
surprises) in order to arrive at NDE (changes, sur- 
prises). That is, a (smooth) approximation of a nor- 
mal distribution may be the result of subtracting 
one distribution from another. To test this, we re- 
move from earnings for each firm-year a random- 
ly determined ‘pseudo-accrual’ component of 
earnings (rather than DACC) sampled from a nor- 
mal distribution with mean and standard deviation 
set equal to the distribution of DACC for the spe- 
cific earnings bin, and re-run our tests. We repeat 
this procedure 1,000 times. Whereas our main re- 
sults show the removal of DACC almost always 
leads to the disappearance of the discontinuity 
from NDE (see above), discontinuities in ‘pseudo- 
NDE’ (i.e. earnings after removal of the ‘pseudo- 
accrual’ component) remain in 2% of cases. A 
binomial test, significant at the 1% level, rejects 
the null of a smooth distribution (as obtained in 
our main tests).2’ 
We therefore conclude that our results are robust 
to not only different specifications of DACC but 
also that they represent a real, rather than a statis- 
tical, effect. 
139 
shown ‘below the line’, were income-decreasing 
while the majority of exceptional items, i.e. within 
the normal course of business items and thus 
‘above the line’, were income-increasing. This 
prima facie case of the misuse of extraordinary 
items, i.e. either classifying ordinary expenses as 
extraordinary expenses or extraordinary revenues 
as ordinary revenues, led to their virtual elimina- 
tion by FRS 3?2 If this basis for the standard was 
valid, its introduction would have necessitated the 
alteration of companies’ earnings management 
techniques. We therefore re-run our main tests on 
pre-FRS 3 and post-FRS 3 sub-~amples.2~ 
For earnings levels, we find that in the pre-FRS 
3 period the discontinuity in earnings noted previ- 
ously is absent, whereas in the post-FRS 3 period 
it is present. This suggests that a change of earn- 
ings management behaviour did indeed occur 
around the time of FRS 3’s issuance. Our whole- 
period result thus reflects a weighted averaging of 
the two sub-period results, with the absence of an 
effect in the earlier period (about one-third of our 
observations) serving partially to mask the effect 
clearly evident in the later period (about two-thirds 
of our observations), i.e. the results reported for 
the whole period are a conservative estimate of the 
post-FRS 3 period effect. In contrast to this, but 
consistent with our expectations, the absence of a 
discontinuity for NDE that we find for the whole 
period sample is also evident for both of the sub- 
periods. 
Also consistent with our prior expectations and 
our whole period results, our tests of earnings 
changes show, for both pre-FRS3 and post-FRS 3 
sub-periods, a clear discontinuity in AE but none 
in ANDE. The differing results for the pre-FRS 3 
period earnings levels and changes may be attrib- 
uted to the (mis)use then of XI to achieve break 
even, i.e. an absolute target, but the necessity to 
manage earnings using DACC to achieve the prior 
year’s EXBI result, i.e. a relative target not achiev- 
able using XI themselves. 
For earnings surprises, the results are again in 
line with those for the whole period, i.e. both pre- 
and post-FRS 3 periods show the expected discon- 
tinuity in ES, although the results are less clear cut 
than those for AE. Again, this suggests the use of 
DACC to meet a target not amenable to XI manip- 
ulation. 
The tests on the two sub-periods described 
above are, as for those on the whole period, con- 
ducted in terms of earnings levels, changes and 
surprises before extraordinary items (as detailed 
on pages 11-12). This is because we hypothesise 
that it is earnings before extraordinary items 
(EBXI) that are the focus of analyst interest and 
hence of earnings management activities. 
However, whether this is actually the relevant tar- 
get is an empirical question. We thus repeat the 
5. Did FRS 3 alter company earnings 
management activities? 
As documented above, our main analysis concern- 
ing discontinuities around zero is based upon sam- 
ples drawn from the period of 1989-1998. 
Mid-way through that period, a new financial re- 
porting standard, FRS 3 (Accounting Standards 
Board, 1992) was introduced, in part to prevent the 
use of extraordinary items as an earnings manage- 
ment tool. At the time, it had been noted that a 
large majority of extraordinary items, i.e. those 
outside the normal course of business and thus 
_____ 
21 We are grateful to one of our reviewers for suggesting this 
additional test of our results. 
22 Post-FRS 3, most items that previously classified as ex- 
traordinary (XI) became special (SI) 
23 We exclude accounting periods ending in the period dur- 
ing which compliance with FRS 3 was voluntary. This is to 
avoid any bias caused by self-selection in compliance. 
Accounrancy (1993) reports that firms were voluntarily adopt- 
ing FRS 3 in financial statements issued as early as November 
1992. It quotes the chairman of one such firm as saying 
‘[Early adoption of FRS 31 does not have a major impact on 
the results of the company for the half year or for the previous 
year, but it does have the consequence of increasing marginal- 
ly our earnings per share in both periods as the result of in- 
cluding within ordinary activities certain items previously 
classified as extraordinary.’ 
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above tests using earnings levels and changes after 
extraordinary items (EAXI) ?4 
When examining earnings levels for the whole 
sample period, we find that the pattern reported in 
our main (EBXI) results, i.e. the presence of a dis- 
continuity for earnings and its absence for NDE, is 
repeated for EAXI. This is may be attributed to the 
overall effect of XIS being small relative to the 
larger number of firm-years without XIS. The pat- 
terns for the two sub-periods (pre- and post-FRS 3) 
are also consistent with those reported for EBXI. 
For earnings changes, the pattern of results is in- 
teresting. Examining AE(AX1) for the whole peri- 
od, the discontinuity is more equivocal, i.e. while 
the coefficients (standard differences - not report- 
ed but see Table 2 for structure) of the bins below 
zero are significant for all models tested, those just 
above zero are not (although consistently ap- 
proaching significant levels). The pattern for 
ANDE(AX1) is similar, i.e. a discontinuity is pres- 
ent, again suggesting that in the pre-FRS 3 period 
XIS were indeed used for earnings management 
purposes. Examining the two sub-periods, the pat- 
tern for the pre-FRS 3 period is similar to that for 
earnings levels whilst that for the post-FRS 3 peri- 
od is as described for the whole period, i.e. again 
the pre-FRS 3 sub-period effect partially masks the 
post-FRS 3 effect. 
The above results indicate that the use of extraor- 
dinary items as an earnings management tool is 
worthy of further investigation. To provide this, we 
also examine the distribution of extraordinary (XI) 
and special items (SI - a post-FRS 3 Datastream 
defined category capturing items categorised as ex- 
traordinary pre-FRS 3) conditional on earnings rel- 
ative to targets. This enables us to evaluate further 
whether firms widely used misclassification of XI 
and SI as a means of achieving earnings targets. 
The main prior expectation we have on the rela- 
tionship between earnings and XI or SI is that large 
negative earnings would be associated with low av- 
erage XI or SI and high (low) incidence of negative 
(positive) XI or SI. This prediction is based on pre- 
vious evidence that the incidence of negative XI 
and SI is greater in periods of financial distress or 
extremely poor performance (Elliott and Shaw, 
1988; Hanna, 1999). To the extent that firms trans- 
form small deficits into small surpluses by misclas- 
sifying XI or SI, we expect small surplus 
firm-years to have unusually low average XI or SI, 
unusually high frequency of negative XI or SI, and 
unusually low frequency of positive XI or SI. 
Figure 2 plots average XI and the incidence of 
negative and positive XI for equal-sized portfolios 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
of firm-years based on ranked negative and posi- 
tive earnings relative to targets. This figure relates 
to the pre-FRS 3 period, defined in this section as 
all accounting periods ending on or before 30 June 
1992, FRS 3 having been issued on 29 October 
1992. Figure 3 reports the equivalent results for 
post-FRS 3 accounting periods, i.e. average SI, 
and the incidence of negative and positive SI. We 
define post-FRS 3 in this section as those account- 
ing periods ending on or after 22 June 1993, the 
date from which mandatory compliance with FRS 
3 was req~ired.2~ Our earnings levels and changes 
portfolios comprise 200 observations each, while 
our pre- and post-FRS 3 earnings surprise portfo- 
lios are constructed to have 127 and 11 8 observa- 
tions respectively, these being the numbers of 
exact zero surprises in the samples concerned. 
Figure 2 Panel A1 presents a plot of average XI 
by earnings portfolios. A broadly positive relation- 
ship between XI and earnings is clearly observ- 
able, indicating that as earnings increase, so too do 
average XI. Panels A2 and A3 present the plots of 
the proportion of observations in each portfolio re- 
porting negative and positive XI, respectively. 
Panel A2 clearly shows that the incidence of nega- 
tive XI decreases steadily as earnings increase, 
while Panel A3 shows that the incidence of posi- 
tive XI is relatively stable over the range of earn- 
ings. Examining the region around zero, there is no 
clear evidence in any of the panels consistent with 
the use of XI classification to transform small 
deficits into small surpluses. 
Similarly, Panels B 1, B2 and B3 present average 
XI and the incidence of negative and positive XI 
conditional on earnings change. As before, there is 
a broadly positive relationship between XI and 
earnings changes. The incidence of negative XI 
falls as earnings change increases, but the inci- 
dence of positive XI is relatively stable as earnings 
change varies. This pattern is broadly consistent 
with the expectation that the incidence of negative 
XI is associated with poor (or distressed) perform- 
ance. As with the levels sample, we do not observe 
around zero earnings changes any clear evidence 
of variation in XI that suggests the use of XI clas- 
sification to achieve positive earnings changes. 
However, it does appear that the smallest negative 
earnings change portfolio has relatively high inci- 
dence of negative XI and low incidence of positive 
XI. This is consistent with the use of XI classifica- 
tion to minimise earnings decreases. 
Panels C 1, C2 and C3 present plots of average 
XI and the incidence of negative and positive XI 
by earnings surprise portfolio. Extreme negative 
earnings surprises are associated with extremely 
low average XI, relatively high incidence of nega- 
tive XI and relatively low incidence of positive XI, 
as predicted. Strikingly, with the exception of the 
extreme negative earnings surprise portfolio, the 
~ 
24 We would like to thank one of the reviewers for suggest- 
ing that we investigate this issue. Note that we do not conduct 
this test for earnings surprises as the I/B/E/S data upon which 
that work is based is not amenable to this. 
25 1.e. the sample is selected per footnote 23 .  
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zero earnings surprise portfolio has the lowest av- 
erage XI. Further related evidence is presented in 
Panels C2 and C3. With no exceptions, the zero 
surprise portfolio has the highest proportion of 
negative XI and lowest proportion of positive XI. 
This is again consistent with ordinary expenses 
being classified as extraordinary and extraordinary 
revenues being classified as ordinary so as to facil- 
itate achievement of exact zero earnings surprises. 
In Figure 3, we conduct a similar analysis of the 
use of SI subsequent to implementation of FRS 3. 
Panels A 1, A2 and A3 report average SI and the in- 
cidence of negative and positive SI by portfolios 
based on ranked earnings. As expected, and con- 
sistent with the results for the pre-FRS 3 period, 
firm-years with large losses have relatively low 
average SI, high incidence of negative SI and low 
incidence of positive SI. We do not observe that 
small profit firm-years have unusually many nega- 
tive SI or unusually few positive SI. 
Panels B 1 ,  B2 and B3 report similar plots but 
conditional on earnings changes. As with the plots 
conditional on earnings levels, we do not observe 
that small positive earnings changes portfolio have 
unusually many negative SI or unusually few pos- 
itive SI. However, to the left of zero, we note that 
the smallest negative earnings change portfolio ap- 
pears to have relatively many negative SI and few 
positive SI. This result suggests the use of SI clas- 
sification as a means of minimising negative earn- 
ings changes. 
Average SI and the incidence of negative and 
positive SI are plotted by earnings surprise portfo- 
lio in Panels C1, C2 and C3. These plots indicate 
that the zero earnings surprise portfolio have un- 
usually few negative and positive SI. The low in- 
cidence of positive SI would be consistent with 
firm classifying positive special revenues as ordi- 
nary to manage earnings upwards. However, the 
low incidence of negative SI is contrary to the 
classification of ordinary expenses as special to 
manage earnings upward to meet forecasts exactly. 
One plausible reason for this occurrence is that 
firms might also be managing earnings downward 
to meet forecasts exactly. In this case, the low in- 
cidence might reflect the presence of firms classi- 
fying special expenses as ordinary to manage 
earnings downward in order to meet forecasts ex- 
actly. However, the plausibility of this argument 
depends on the conjecture that firms managing 
earnings upward to meet forecasts misclassify spe- 
cial revenues as ordinary, while firms managing 
earnings downward to meet forecasts misclassify 
special expenses as ordinary. We are not aware of 
theoretical support for this conjecture. 
In summary, we find some evidence consistent 
with the achievement of positive earnings levels, 
changes and surprises being facilitated by misclas- 
sification of XI or SI. However, the picture is com- 
141 
plex, e.g. we do observe evidence that exact zero 
earnings surprises are associated with relatively 
frequent occurrence of negative XI and infrequent 
occurrence of positive XI. This is consistent with 
misclassification of positive and negative XI as a 
means of managing earnings upward to meet fore- 
casts exactly. 
6. Conclusion 
We study a large sample of UK firm-years and 
document that earnings are distributed discontinu- 
ously around basic targets while non-discretionary 
earnings are not. We report that discretionary ac- 
cruals have the effect of increasing the frequency 
of achievement of positive earnings levels, 
changes and surprises. In particular, discretionary 
accruals have the effect of increasing the incidence 
of small positive earnings levels, changes and sur- 
prises, and decreasing the incidence of small neg- 
ative earnings levels. We therefore conclude that 
discretionary accruals are a significant cause of the 
discontinuity observed in the distribution of earn- 
ings relative to basic targets. In addition, we report 
evidence consistent with the use of discretionary 
accruals to reduce the magnitude of large negative 
and positive earnings changes and surprises. 
This evidence confirms that discretionary accru- 
als are used in managing earnings to achieve tar- 
gets, and validates the use of such accruals as a 
proxy for earnings management. However, the ev- 
idence we report indicates that it is not reasonable 
to assume that firms invariably seek to increase 
earnings when using discretionary accruals, an as- 
sumption implicit in some of the previous litera- 
ture. We show that the directional use of 
discretionary accruals as an earnings management 
mechanism varies with the relationship between 
unmanaged earnings and basic earnings targets. 
The specific manner in which firms use discre- 
tionary accruals must be considered when using 
them to proxy for earnings management. 
We further report that exact zero earnings sur- 
prises are associated with relatively high variance 
in discretionary accruals. This suggests extensive 
earnings management to meet forecasts exactly. In 
addition, we find that exact achievement of fore- 
casts is associated with relatively low average ex- 
traordinary items, high incidence of negative 
extraordinary items and low incidence of positive 
extraordinary items. This is consistent with mis- 
classification of extraordinary items as a method 
of managing earnings upward to meet forecasts ex- 
actly. In addition, we observe some evidence in the 
pre-FRS 3 period of misclassification of extraordi- 
nary items to facilitate achievement of positive 
earnings levels or changes. We therefore conclude 
that since FRS 3 discretionary working capital ac- 
cruals are prime among methods used by firms to 
achieve basic earnings targets. 
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Figure 2 
Use of extraordinary items pre-FRS 3 
Panel A - Earnings levels portfolios 
Panel A1 Average extraordinary items 
Panel A2 Proportion of observations with negative items 
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Panel A3 Proportion of observations with positive items 
16 portfolios of 200 observations each, based on Earnings before Extraordinary Items 
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Figure 2 
Use of extraordinary items pre-FRS 3 
Panel B - Earnings changes portfolios 
Panel B1 Average extraordinary items 
Panel B3 Proportion of observations with positive items 
16 portfolios of 200 observations each based on Earnings before Extraordinary Items 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 19
:03
 29
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
3 
144 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
Figure 2 
Use of extraordinary items pre-FRS 3 
Panel C - Earnings surprises portfolios 
Panel C1 Average extraordinary items 
Panel C2 Proportion of observations with negative items 
Panel C3 Proportion of observations with positive items 
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Seven portfolios of 127 observations each based on Earnings before Extraordinary Items 
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Figure 3 
Use of special items post-FRS 3 
Panel A - Earnings levels portfolios 
Panel A1 Average special items 
Panel A2 Proportion of observations with negative items 
Panel A3 
29 portfolios of 200 observations each based on Earnings before Extraordinary Items 
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Figure 3 
Use of special items post-FRS 3 
Panel B - Earnings changes portfolios 
Panel B1 Average special items 
Panel B2 Proportion of observations with negative items 
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Panel B3 Proportion of observations with positive items 
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29 portfolios of 200 observations each based on Earnings before Extraordinary Items 
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Figure 3 
Use of special items post-FRS 3 
Panel C - Earnings surprises portfolios 
Panel C1 Average special items 
Panel C2 Proportion of observations with negative items 
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Panel C3 Proportion of observations with positive items 
24 portfolios of 1 18 observations each based on Earnings before Extraordinary Items 
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